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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the current rhetoric of expediency in the United States
and the expedient ethical perspective it fosters. It argues that the competitive
rhetoric of corporate America has not only invaded every sector of society, but

that it has caused untold human suffering by promoting what has become a
mind-set, an expedient ideology. In the first two chapters, I suggest two different
ways of combating the expedient mindset: speaking out, and looking in. Focusing
mainly on recommendations and suggestions from Burke in Chapter One, I

suggest the “lexicological response” as a way to legitimately “speak truth to
power.” I also attempt to address the need introduce a more focused discussion
on other ways to counter expedient rhetoric. Relying heavily on the philosophy of

Emmanuel Levinas in connection with Burke’s rhetorical theory in Chapter two,
my goal is to highlight a way to view the other through the “empathic frame,”
which I argue is a sure way to counter expedient rhetoric both externally and

internally. Chapter three combines these two ideas of speaking out and looking

in an attempt to get beyond what Burke calls “mere relativism” in postmodern

thinking, and introduces to the conversation the idea of the self as a container of
both conscious and unconscious rhetors, the dissociated self, and the associated

self respectively. However, the theme throughout is use of the “empathic frame”
as a way to identify with the other, thereby offering a solid counter to the rhetoric
and ethics of expediency.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE RHETORIC OF EXPEDIENCY AND
THE LEXICOLOGICAL RESPONSE

Rhetoric and ethics have long shared a complex relationship. In ancient

Greece, differences concerning the place of the good, the true, and ethics or
“right acting” in the study of rhetoric were on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Plato believed transcendent truth exists and is not only accessible butthat “...the
philosopher’s task is to help others remember...” the truth hidden in their own

minds, and that "since this process of inquiry takes place through verbal

exchange, the definition of rhetoric’s proper province is central to Plato’s
understanding of knowledge” (Bizzell 81). He also believed that rhetoric should

be employed only in search of what is True, and although rhetoric did become a
key subject for Plato, his main concern was distinguishing the difference between

“true and false rhetoric” (Bizzell 28). The Sophists saw things differently,
believing that it is impossible for humans to “obtain absolute knowledge, and

consequently concerned themselves only with probabilities, which Plato regarded
as mere appearances of the truth” (Bizzell 81).

Those who came after, particularly Cicero and Quintilian, continued to

explore the problem of the place of ethics in rhetoric introduced by the arguments
that went before. For instance, according to Kenneth Burke, Cicero, in the first

book of De Oratore, recalled a “mythic stage" when “right acting and right
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speaking were considered one” citing Homer’s education of Achilles. He
continues stating that “...[Cicero] notes regretfully the sharp dissociating of action

and speech whereby the Sophists would eventually confine rhetoric to the verbal
in a sheerly ornamental sense. And following this, he notes further detractions
from the dignity of rhetoric caused by the dissociating of rhetoric and philosophy”

(Rhetoric 59). This “dissociating of rhetoric and philosophy,” will become a key
point of discussion in chapter three of this thesis; however, for now it is important

to continue the discussion of the historical perspective on the connection of
“rhetoric and philosophy,” or more specifically, the place of philosophy in rhetoric.

In his commentary on De Oratore, Burke goes on to say that Cicero
blamed Plato’s Socrates for the “detraction from the dignity of rhetoric” and he

points out the irony in that ultimately, “...the Socratic attempt to make systematic
allowance for the gradual increase of cultural heterogeneity and scientific
specialization was blamed for the very situation which had called it forth and

which it was designed to handle” (Rhetoric 59-60). According to Burke, then,

Cicero accused Socrates for the development over time of a complete
dissociation of philosophy and rhetoric. “Rhetoric suffers from the division, Cicero

notes, because a distinction arises between “wisdom” and “eloquence” which
would justify the Sophists’ reduction of rhetoric to sheer verbal blandishments”

(60). Whether Cicero’s assessment of Plato’s Socrates is correct or not, (and
whether Burke’s interpretation of Cicero is correct or not), a distinction between

wisdom and eloquence has always been at the crux of the problem of the place
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of ethics in rhetoric, and Quintilian, like Cicero, devoted much of his life to
addressing the issue.

Quintilian’s main interest in rhetoric was in teaching others, from birth to

retirement, to become not only good orators but also good people. His focus was
pedagogy of two kinds: rhetoric and philosophy. According to the editors of The
Rhetorical Tradition'.

Quintilian’s insistence that the good speaker be a good man is

usually cited as the only important idea for which he might claim
originality. Yet, in its broad outlines, this idea is already familiar
from Plato’s Phaedrus, Isocrates’ Antidosis, and Cicero’s De
Oratore. As historian of rhetoric James J. Murphy explains, some

scholars have rioted that Quintilian does differ from his rhetorical

predecessors in his much more detailed attention to pedagogy. The
Institutes gives advice on the development of a good man who

speaks well, from his birth through his early education,
apprenticeship, mature career, and dignified retirement. (Bizzell

360)
More than this Bizzell goes on, “Quintilian’s focus on lifelong development of the

orator” has “theoretical implications” that his predecessors did not seem to
recognize. His main goal was not just to teach an orator to become well-rounded
through an exhaustive study of philosophy. He was far more interested in

application of that philosophy. He would have been the first to agree with Burke’s’
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condemnation of the “...empty accumulation of facts [...] where, if ‘Knowledge is '

power,’ people ‘get power’ by gaining possession of its ‘insignia’” (Attitudes 170).
According to Bizzell, “Quintilian recommends that the orator study philosophy...,”
however,"... [he] wishes to call attention not just to the quantity of an orator’s

reading, but to the sincerity with which he applies the ideas to life" (360). In

today’s technological world, access to knowledge of all kind lies at our fingertips,
yet our advances in technology seem to have done little to increase our ability to
treat each other ethically, especially in the world of economic advancement. In

fact, in that area, just as in the days of the Great Depression, the only ethic to be
found today seems to be the ethic of expediency. Steven B. Katz suggests this

present time of deep strife is directly related to the rhetoric and ethics of

expediency, and it is a time when it would serve us well to reconsider the
perspectives of Cicero and Quintilian.

In his moving article “The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric,
Technology, and the Holocaust,” Katz argues that the unthinkable acts
committed against the Jewish people by the Third Reich during WWII were the

result of “a political and technological blindness deliberately created in and
through rhetoric" (269). He describes in detail how the deliberative rhetoric of an
entire nation became so distorted that it opened the door for the absolute

devaluation of human life and allowed for the insane strategy of the “final

solution." Katz states

.. Hitler combined the ethic of expediency embedded in

rhetoric with technology to create the ethos of Nazi Germany” (269; emphasis in
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the original). His article is a warning that we should question whether the current
ethic of expediency promoted by a highly competitive and technical corporate

world has once again embedded itself in our deliberative rhetoric. Katz also

suggests that we should ask ourselves whether the philosophies of Cicero and
Quintilian could be put to good use in addressing “the whole panoply of ethics” in

every area of the work we do (272).
Quintilian’s idea—that the well-trained rhetorician attempting to apply

some form of moral philosophy to life is better for society than the well-trained
rhetorician who just wants to win the argument—will guide this thesis.

Specifically, in this thesis 1 will explore how the moral philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas, his concept of absolute responsibility to the other, and his “elementary

truth” that we all suffer, might be applied to Kenneth Burke’s concept of
examination of motivation in order to counter the current ethic of expediency,
which, according to Katz, can no longer go unchallenged.

Katz’s article is based on an actual memo submitted to a high-ranking SS
officer about how to modify trucks used to pack in and gas people. Its content is

shows only a deep concern about how to get the job done in the, most expedient

way. Katz says, “...this memo from the standpoint of technical communication,
argumentation, and style [...] is an almost perfect document” (256). It is an
almost perfect example of expedient rhetoric and ethics along with being a

horrendous testimony to how low humanity can sink when other human beings
are seen as objects. And it helps to define how the terms “expedient, rhetoric" and
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“expedient ethics” will be used throughout this thesis: mainly as any rhetoric or
ethical stance that discounts the humanity of the other. “What concerns me most

here,” Katz says about the memo, “is how, based on an ethic of expediency,
rhetoric was made to serve the holocaust" (257).

In a similar vein, what concerns me most in this thesis is how the primary
rhetoric of our everyday culture-forensic rhetoric (speech concerning past

action), epideictic rhetoric (speech intended to strengthen shared beliefs about
the present state of affairs), and deliberative rhetoric (speech defining actions to

be taken in the future)-have all fallen heavily under the control of institutions that

promote and serve a highly competitive mindset. The next step up from this
competitive mindset (as has been proven in financial markets recently) is the

expedient mindset, which considers any move as fair in the game as long as it

serves one’s goal in the competition. Although, I am not suggesting that where we
■

*

>

are in the United States at the present moment means we are soon heading for

another time of mass extermination, I am suggesting that one can hardly turn a

blind eye anymore to the mass suffering of so many people in this country due to

expedient rhetoric and ethics. This thesis will explore the idea that postmodern
relativism has contributed to the end of philosophy in rhetorical conversation and

it will suggest that an unwillingness to even discuss certain terms like “truth” has
helped expedient rhetoric and ethics take hold in our culture. It will also suggest

ways to bring philosophy back into the discussion
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Katz says, “I think it can be asserted without too much argument that the

te/os of life in the United States is economic progress. In the United States,

success and happiness, both personal and communal, are measured in
monetary terms. In a capitalistic culture, it is ‘economic expediency’ that drives
most behavior” (270; emphasis in original). Katz wrote his warning over ten
years ago, and I would argue that things have only gotten worse. I also suggest
that, with “economic expediency” driving behavior throughout the last century in

this country, we are now reaching a point of critical mass in which our general
culture respects only one kind of rhetoric really: the kind that agrees competition
has always been good, that competition is good now, and that competition will

serve us well in the future. Almost nowhere do we find rhetoric in the general

culture of the United States that points to our highly competitive society, which

led to a highly expedient mindset on Wall Street, as being the cause of the

economic collapse we are now witnessing.
The rhetoric and ethic of expediency promoted by a highly competitive and

technical corporate world has had a devastating impact on everyday rhetoric in

the United States. The “American Dream" has become an American nightmare
by a self-serving ideology concerned only with the quickest route to revenue.

The rhetoric created by this mindset degrades the value of human existence and
causes an any-thing-goes-in-the-game perspective, especially in our corporate

and financial institutions. This competitive rhetoric of capitalism has become our
cultural language, embedded from top to bottom.
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To begin with, contemporary America is awash in media control that
barrages us with the idea that we have no choice but to accept the expedient
mindset. Back in October of 2006, media mogul Roger Ailes, had one goal in
mind: “I want Fox News Channel to be the dominant source of news in America

and around the world" (Gold L.A. Times E5). Who can doubt that he succeeded?
Not only does this self-proclaimed “fair and unbiased,” network run by “a canny

former GOP operative" hold the attention of a majority of Americans with its
coverage, but its broadcasters mirror the “competitive, pugilistic spirit" of its
founder. Fox News has turned itself into a highly successful propaganda machine

for corporate America that peddles the expedient ideology of competition
wholesale. And this same ideology has infiltrated our culture in a myriad of ways.
One can hardly watch a conventional TV show, listen to a conventional
radio program, or watch a conventional movie without the message of

competition finding its way in somewhere. Everywhere Americans are sold the
“Bring-it-on” attitude, and we live in an age when we are expected to accept this

pugnacious stance as not only just-the-way-it-is, but also as just-the-way-welike-it. I suggest that the nationwide promotion of “out-wit, out-last, out-play”

rhetoric, and the expedient ethic it fosters, has contributed to the economic

collapse we’ve witnessed in the United States, and that it has also been a major
factor in the economic disparity that now exists. The disproportion of wealth

between classes has become so great that there is now the beginning of a .
groundswell of support for a movement aimed at combating this expedient
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mindset of greed. The economic structure of corporate capitalism, which fosters
competitive rhetoric and practices through its anti-social institutions,- is under
attack. To engage in the battle for change, we need ways to object, to dissent

peacefully, and because of its significance to this need, I intend to feature

Burke’s essay “The Poetry of Action.”
In Permanence and Change, Kenneth Burke combines linguistic and

sociological theory, a merger that would come to play a central role in developing,

his system of Dramatism. The chapter “Poetry and Action” introduces the result

of this merger--a theory on how we might practically interpret human existence. It

also encompasses how Burke proposed to defend a cooperative, participant
society against the expedient rhetoric of his time, a time in America much like
today, when an ultra-competitive-anything-goes economic structure promoted
expedient rhetoric at every turn. Burke calls his theory the “poetic psychology,”

and he stresses its importance as a counter to “...institutions serving an anti
social function”:

A completely systematized ‘poetic psychology’ should form the
subject of another work, though we have attempted to scatter
throughout the present book many hints as to the ways in which it

should be applied in our attempts to chart the civic process. What
we wish to emphasize now is the fact that the poetic metaphor

offers an invaluable perspective from which to judge the world of
contingencies. (266)
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Talking about the contingencies forced upon society by the “poetaster,” Burke
further states that the perspective provided by “the poetic metaphor” enhances
the civic process by “...emphasizing the participant aspect of action rather than
its competitive aspect, hence offering a prompt basis of objection when the

contingencies of our economic structure force us to overstress competitive
attitudes” (266; emphasis in original). Confronted every day with the rhetoric of
our own ultra-competitive society, we too need an angle from which to respond

without ourselves becoming ultra-competitive. It is my intention to address such

an angle—an idea for adopting a rhetoric designed to counter competitive
attitudes that allows the participant to remain unidentified with external strife,

thereby remaining free of internal strife. However, it is first necessary to address

Burke’s “poetic metaphor” further, not only because it lays the foundation for this
idea, but also because it is so relevant to the current wave of economic and

political rhetoric in America, a rhetoric that fosters competition and consequently

the ethic of expediency.
Burke is convinced that the poetic metaphor has a timeless value, and he

proclaims its indispensability: “The conclusion we should draw from our thesis is
a belief that the ultimate metaphor for discussing the universe and man’s
relations to it must be the poetic or dramatic metaphor” (263). He says the poetic
psychology can encompass all other ways of seeing man, from the “political

being of Aristotle” all the way to “Nietzsche’s metaphor, man as warrior” (264).
And he adds that it can “go beyond them all” (264). Finally, he tells us the poetic
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metaphor offers encouragement, even hope in moments of abysmal angst

stating, “And even if we are led to fear that this drama is essentially tragic, the

poetic metaphor reminds us that in a perfect tragedy there is ‘catharsis,’ hence
we may be heartened to inquire what form this catharsis may take” (266). With

such a strong recommendation from Burke, it is no wonder we find in the poetic
metaphor, as defined in Permanence and Change, a foundation for countering

the “cult of dominance” in the 21st century and the competitive actions and

attitudes caused by their rhetoric.
Even though Burke would indeed have much more to say about the

subject in later years, his concept of the poetic metaphor as outlined, during the
Great Depression is particularly relevant for fostering cooperative civic interaction

and countering expedient rhetoric in today’s America of protracted recession.
And it does so first and foremost by showing us what it means to act with “style.”

“For style,” Burke proclaims, “is an elaborate set of prescriptions and
proscriptions for ‘doing the right thing’” (268). This definition could, be construed

as a form of the rhetorical principle of kairos, but it can also refer to the principles

found at a certain level of being—a level of being that Levinas would say was

under the influence of the “conscience morale.” In this sense, it is an inner place,

“...a state-of-being-without-offense” (note 2, 269) Burke says, a state of being
that, at the very least, precludes perpetrating blatant harm on others, and at best,

is absolutely in tune with the other, for from it springs “...a constant meeting of
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obligations...” (note 2, 269), in regard to the other, “...a repeated doing of the

‘right thing.’”
However, Burke adds the following caveat to his simple definition of style
as “doing the right thing”: “—and when an individual cannot “justify” himself by
the spontaneous use of such ’congregational’ responses, he is driven all the

more intensely to attain his justification through ‘segregational’ acts and attitudes”
(268). What follows in his discussion of style clearly illustrates the relevance of

his theory of the poetic metaphor in relation to the current and transparent

rhetoric of competition and conquest.
In the days of the Depression there existed an overabundance of self

proclaimed corporate marketeers who were completely out of touch with what it
means to do business through “congregational responses” to the needs of

society. Success back then became "...identical with conquest,” exactly the
opposite of what Burke refers to as “an era greatly marked by style and rite,” one

in which “we ‘succeed by acquiescing to its many non-competitive ways of being

‘right.’” And what follows is a statement made by Burke in the 1930’s about the
robber-baron mentality that could easily be applied to the expedient rhetoric of
Wall Street manipulators today: “At present, such modes of ingratiation are

reduced to a minimum. And what remnants of style we have, are converted by
class prerogatives into a purely invidious label, a way of suggesting superiority

rather than of affirming solidarity” (268). I am here immediately reminded of the

arrogance in the rhetoric from a certain faction on the far right who repeatedly
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claim that obscene wealth is not held in contempt, but rather seen as a shining
example of what all Americans aspire to obtain. While it is hard to imagine a

claim that would work better for the provocation of animosity or resentment, this

presumptuous style of rhetoric does illustrate nicely the disconnect between

those blinded by their perceived superiority and the common person.
In such times, Burke says, the “poetic or humane sense” of the word'
“utility” loses its meaning, which “...has a much broader range then is suggested
by the restrictions which the industrial economist places upon the term" (269).
Here Burke refers to capitalists whose hands twist the meaning into a
perspective that imposes on a culture “...rigors which even the most primitive

societies were spared” (269). Their narrow meaning of the term “utility”
undermines or discredits even simple acts of kindness, and they scoff at ‘doing

the right thing’ at as a sign of weakness. “The cult of dominance,” degrades the
utility of style into forms of “...abnegation and resignation,” which, Burke says,

“...a combative society would probably describe as mere cowardice” (269).

Burke’s description of the industrial economist’s mentality of the ‘30’s is
indistinguishable from the corrupt corporate capitalist mindset that caused the
recent collapse of the American economy and the deep ongoing recession. At
both points in our history combative and unscrupulous financiers tended to see

“doing the right thing,” or any form of what Burke calls “self-interference,” as the
weakness of cowardice, if they thought of it at all.
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In a profound way, Burke’s poetic metaphor is a call to “do the right thing,’’
but it is also a call to action. “An ethics involves one ultimately in a philosophy of

being, as opposed to a philosophy of becoming...” he says, reminding us that a
philosophy of being is note “...philosophy of passivity, or acquiescence.” Rather,

“...one may also ‘resign’ oneself to struggle.” As symbol using animals it is
dictated, we must act, and if our actions are to foster “...the establishment of
decent social or communicative relationships,’’ Burke claims, “...one may hold
that certain historically conditioned institutions interfere with” such relationships.

He also says that “...one may further hold that certain groups or classes of

persons are mainly responsible for the retention of these socially dangerous
institutions” adding finally, “...a philosophy of being may commit one to open
conflict with any persons or class of persons who would use their power to
uphold institutions serving an anti-social function” (271; emphasis in original).
It is with this idea in mind that I would like to illustrate a way to respond to

expedient rhetoric through a personal story. I call this tactic the lexicological
response, and although it may not always be effective/its main asset lies in its
A

1

'
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ability to allow one to engage in countering expedient rhetoric while remaining

reasonably objective. In a classroom, at the Master’s level, I once heard a
student bring up a conversation she’d had with one of her friends from — and

she air-quoted — “the ghetto.” She said they were relaxing one evening
engrossed in a quiet conversation, and her friend musing allowed in wonder said,

“Why do so many of us, once we make it, become Republicans?"
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My classmate said she didn’t waste a second to respond, telling her friend,
“I don’t know about anybody else, but I know with me it’s because I had to fight

my way to get where I am. Hey! I had to scratch and crawl and struggle the
whole way, and I figure now that 1 got mine, well baby, you get yours, but don’t

you go expecting no help from me!" All the while her index finger waved back and
forth as if it too was saying “no way baby.”

I replied—loud enough for the rest of the class to hear—“That’s selfish.”

Nobody jumped in to sing the chorus of that song with me. My statement
fell flat and was generally ignored as the conversation drifted on to a new topic,

although I did feel some energy that seemed to indicate silent agreement with

what I’d said. A short while later the class ended and I was feeling a little alone,
but I certainly wasn’t concerned about being judged as combative, or of being in
an identity/difference relationship with the woman.

At’that moment in time I wasn’t interested at all in taking up an offensive
position against her, and I was not preparing to argue in defense of any particular
philosophical perspective; I was simply stating fact because, in this instance, the

woman had defined herself And she defined herself in front of the entire class.
In other words, at that moment in time, she put herself in the embarrassing
position of being the living breathing definition of the term “selfish.” It couldn’t
have been clearer, and this is why I believe it is possible to experience relative
peace internally through non-identification with one’s own beliefs while objecting

to another’s obviously anti-social rhetoric.
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America is awash in the ideological rhetoric of “I’ve got mine now you get

yours,” and all institutions founded on it serve what Burke might call an anti

social function. We live in a time when it is extremely important to put the
discussion of the expedient mindset—which, like disease, can afflict any race,
color, or gender—firmly on the table. It is truly a time to judge people by the
content of their character. All over the news recently, we have been told that the

Occupy Movement has changed the national conversation over corporate power
in America, and that movement is working on a strategy to combat the rhetoric of

expediency, with its key god-term, or perhaps 1 should say godless term:
“Greed.”

My suggestion of using the lexicological response to greed-driven rhetoric
is just that—a suggestion as a small-scale tactic in this upcoming strategy, a
tactic to be used on appropriate occasions, in what appears to be shaping up to

be a long and drawn-out battle. The main reason 1 endorse it is first and
foremost because I believe adding it to the new conversation born of the
movement could lead to other ideas for tactics to counter expedient rhetoric. The

point here is that if we want to keep this “changed conversation” moving, then we
need to discuss all available avenues of combating expedient rhetoric.

The lexicological response has the virtue of allowing participants in the
fray to at least feel clean after confrontation, even though there is no guarantee

they will remain totally unscathed. If we have lexicology to back us up in our
assessment of others, which really amounts to nothing more than simply pointing
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out how others assess themselves, then we can object to anti-social behavior
cleanly. It would at least keep the user ethical in the moment. From this

perspective, effectiveness does not matter so much as one’s own position in the
argument, and the lexicological response serves to help one maintain an ethical

grounding.
Burke asks, “If a man takes great pains to obtain the approval of his

group, does he not thereby give evidence that he needs to be approved?”

(Permanence 81; emphasis in original). It is this idea of how we “give evidence”
of where we stand through our rhetoric that lies at the root of the lexicological
response. If the cliche of “speaking truth to power” can easily be undermined by
the postmodern idea that truth is always already elusive due to the conditional
nature of existence, then we need something that will help us to look for the truth
under all conditions. There can be no better place to look for the definition of truth

than at the rhetoric a person uses in the moment in relation to the lexicon.
U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, during a Senate floor speech, recently said
that “a troubling emergence in the last year of politics...is really this rhetoric that

in my opinion seeks to divide Americans against each other." He then went on

discussing a “theme out there” that lays the blame on the “greedy” for so many
Americans being “worse off,” losing their jobs and homes, and if employed,
making less money for more work. He'said what we really need to do is put the
blame for the disparity in wealth where it belongs-squarely on the

Administration. He then ended his speech with the statement “...we have never

17

been a nation of haves and have-nots. We are a nation of haves and soon-to-

haves” (4). Senator Rubio, at that moment, through his own rhetoric, became the

living definition of “delusion.” He was delusional because his belief in a country of
“haves and soon-to-haves ” was based, by his own admissions, on a false

reality. The obvious question here is how can so many financially suffering
Americans be seen as a “soon-to-haves”? Informing this politician that the
juxtaposition of his declarations defines the word “delusion” would be, in a

tangible way, speaking truth to power.
Another advantage of lexicological response to expedient rhetoric is that
people using this tactic could never be accused of an ad hominem'fallacy in their

argumentation. Use of the lexicological response draws attention to the rhetoric
of a person and looks at how that rhetoric would be defined according to the
lexicon. Saying “that’s selfish" to my classmate was not a personal attack against

her, just as saying “that’s delusional" to Rubio would not be a personal attack
against him. With the lexicological response, rhetoric, actions, and behavior are
indeed judged; however, we are not doing the judging. Through their own rhetoric

and actions, people judge themselves, and people using the lexicological

response to the rhetoric of expediency would be acting responsibly and ethically '
on a case-to-case basis. They would be acting responsibly because (successful
or not) they would be involved in countering anti-social behavior in general, and

they would be acting ethically because (successful or not) they would be
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assisting the perpetrators of such behavior to see how their own rhetoric is

harming not only others, but also themselves.
Chapter one has attempted to address the importance of recognizing and

acting on the fact that in today’s America the wolf of expedient rhetoric is clawing

at the door. It has also suggested one idea that could offer a tactical advantage
for objecting to ultra-competitive anti-social rhetoric. It made an effort to
encourage discussion of any kind in the direction of the “new conversation”

initiated by the Occupy Movement in America. The following chapter will leave
the rhetoric of expediency found in the “...Wrangle of the Market Place, the

flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard” (Burke Rhetoric 23), and look at
rhetoric from a completely different angle—primarily the perspective of
“intrapersonal relations.”

Chapter two will discuss both the "associated” and the “disassociated self’
and how “man uses his rhetoric on himself’ (Fogarty 323), particularly to identify
with various “frames.” However, the main subject of this chapter will be

recognizing and utilizing internal rhetors who promote empathy toward the other.
I will also suggest,that this practice has always been humanity’s primary method
for countering the rhetoric of expediency—by countering that rhetoric internally.

To develop this position, I will enlist the aid of the philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas in. conjunction with the work of Kenneth Burke.
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CHAPTER TWO
COUNTERING INTERNAL EXPEDIENT RHETORIC

THROUGH THE EMPATHIC FRAME

Daniel Fogarty, after close counsel with Burke during the time when

Dramatism was in its final development, wrote an article titled “Kenneth Burke’s
Theory.” In the first paragraph, he states:

According to Burke, man pours all his energies into establishing
and maintaining his personal world of hierarchic order. His survival
depends oh it. And rhetoric is his specific means of seeking or

keeping that order. Not only in intrapersonal relations, where man
uses his rhetoric on himself, where he holds inner parliament as

both speaker and hearer, but in his interpersonal relations....

(322/323; emphasis added)

It is interesting that Fogarty’s article begins with reference to the esteemed place
held by “intrapersonal relations” in Burke’s theory. This idea--that “...man uses

his rhetoric on himself, where he holds inner parliament as both speaker and
hearer”--will be a primary focus of this chapter. I will also focus on the idea that
the conscious selection of certain “centers,” or “sub-personalities, ” can lead to

viewing life through certain “frames” that offer a way to counter the expedient
rhetoric one uses on oneself.
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While drafting his article, Fogarty had many discussions with Burke about

how Burke formulated the ideas for his “pentad." During one such conversation,
Burke pointed to the use of a “...symposium type of inner personal discussion
[...] a five- or six-man discussion group, taking all the speaking parts himself

until he has sifted the best resultant formulation of the idea in question” (326).
The procedure seemed necessary for Burke, says Fogarty, because Burke
believed “...that any one statement or point of view was necessarily only part of
the attainable truth” (326). Fogarty goes on to relate how his friend described his
methodology as a “symposium kind of dialectic” in the following quotation directly

from Burke: “Ideally, all the various ‘voices’ are partisan rhetoricians whose

partial voices ‘competitively cooperate’ to form the position of the dialogue as a
whole (a position that transcends all the partial views of the participants, though

there may be a Socratic voice that is primus inter pares)’” (326). These “partisan

rhetoricians” 1 see as Burke’s associated self. They are associates of one
another because they have a common goal in mind. They are partisans in an

inner parliament because they are intent on cooperating with each other-even

though with seemingly competitive arguments-to attain the common goal of the
best possible understanding of the subject at hand. And they are obviously the

reason why Burke chose to use the word "we” rather than “I" throughout his
writing.

It seems clear that Burke’s internal “partisan rhetoricians” are theorists of
identification and persuasion and would also have to be individual internal
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“rhetors” (one who identifies or attempts to persuade), otherwise how could they
argue their respective points? Burke was obviously aware of this; however, he
was also ever and deeply aware of the dissociated self. This dissociated self is

comprised of competing internal rhetors with no conscious common goal (“rival
factions” Burke calls them), and their use of an internal rhetoric of expediency,

particularly in relation to others, will also be a major concern of this chapter.
Since I agree with Fogarty when he says, “For Burke, the whole range of
(symbolic) activity, from a man’s inner, subconscious conflicts to the highest kind

of conscious abstraction, is rhetoric” (325), when 1 use the term “internal rhetoric"
in this chapter, I will be referring to everything. Gut feelings to the most easily

understandable symbolic activity, everything that passes through our

consciousness or our subconscious, all ethical considerations, all body language
and reactions. Everything we do internally as symbol using animals for the
purpose of identification or persuasion will be considered internal rhetoric. This
term will also be considered synonymous with inner “symbolic action" since
regarding symbolic action “—the issue for Burke is meaning or purpose, not

consciousness or awareness of acting as such (Crusius, Kenneth Burke 165;
emphasis added). Essentially, since rhetoric is seen as anything done to identify
with or persuade, and symbolic action is seen as anything done with meaning or

purpose, throughout chapter two, “internal rhetoric” and “inner symbolic action,”
will be interchangeable.
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This chapter will pay particular attention to “recognizing the humanity of
the other” and becoming an observer of one’s symbolic action regarding the

other through what I call “the empathic frame.” This frame, based on
compassionate consideration of the other, incorporates two of Emmanuel
Levinas’s key concepts on humanity, and I will suggest that putting these key

concepts to use as guiding^ principles during observation of one’s internal
symbolic action in relation to the other can help to create and maintain

identification with the other thereby offering a highly effective counter to the
rhetoric and ethic of expediency.
Levinas views these two concepts as elementary truths or fundamental

realities, and for their use as principles in the empathic frame I’ve labeled them
“The Absolute Value of the Other” and “Inexorable Being and Consequent
Suffering.” However, prior to defining these two principles of the empathic frame,

a look at Burke’s comic frame and Levinas’s main philosophical tenet is in order.
Since the empathic frame and the comic frame both suggest “centers” from
which to observe the self, a look at Burke’s comic frame will help clarify certain

terms relative to the empathic frame. And, since Levinas petitions for a
“philosophy that lives,” defining his “one big thing” will help to illustrate the
foundation of the empathic frame.

Burke’s comic frame is an internal way of seeing things. According to

Burke, we live in two different worlds simultaneously: the external world of the
event, and the internal world of the self. This is always the case, and a comic

23

frame of motives, according to Burke, can show us “how an act can ‘dialectically’

contain both transcendental and material ingredients, both imagination and

bureaucratic embodiment, both ‘service’ and ‘spoils’” (Attitudes 167). Or, he
says, the comic frame can create “a well-balanced ecology” in the individual who
employs it. He sees the comic frame as necessary if one hopes to “accumulate at

least a minimum of spiritual resources,” and calls it a '"method of study (man as
eternal journeyman)” (170; emphasis in original). Burke finalizes his view of the
comic frame as follows: “In sum, the comic frame should enable people to be

observers of themselves, while acting.- Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but
maximum consciousness” (171; emphasis in original). One would ‘transcend’

himself by noting his own foibles. He would provide a rationale for locating the
irrational and the non-rational” (171; emphasis in original). With th$ term

"Observers of themselves" Burke directly addresses an internal perspective, a
view of the inner self.
Burke adds an interesting note to this citation, and it has to do with “the

irrational and the non-rational." In it, he illustrates how the rationalist can only
see a world of rational and irrational. But just as the tree sprouts leaves the mind
engages in non-rational “mental processes” to keep itself alive, and as Burke

puts it “...we question whether social integration can be accomplished without

them.” Social integration here can only mean that on an individual level one must

recognize as generally harmless the wanderings of one’s own mind in order to
function effectively on a social level. The implication is that it is questionable if
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society itself could survive without well-integrated individuals, and if wandering

“mental processes” are seen as simply non-rational rather than irrational we are
less apt to judge ourselves harshly or attempt to automatically eliminate inner

symbolic activities. “...Instead,” Burke says, “We merely, as rational men, ‘watch’

them, to guard ourselves against cases where they work badly. Where they work
well, we can salute them, even coach them” (171). In the end, this perspective of

“non-rational” rather than “irrational” helps one to be a more objective observer of

oneself. Obviously, to “watch” these non-rational mental processes means
prolonged observation. However, a quick glance can also be of service. Through

relaying his thoughts on the observation of non-rational symbolic actions, Burke
suggests not only an objective, but also a positive way to make an ethical choice
concerning the usually unnoticed internal rhetoric that influences us.
If it is true that “everything is rhetoric," that the “whole range of symbolic

activity is rhetoric,” that even the absence of response is rhetoric, then everything
that goes on in our inner world is internal rhetoric. Certainly, if language is

symbolic action, then one’s internal rhetoric in the form of language sets much
into motion. However, language, inner talking, and thought obviously cannot be

considered the only form of internal rhetoric or symbolic action. In “The Poetry of

Action” Burke says:
We also recognize a symbolism of posture, gesture, and tonality, a
purely mimetic symbolism, such as we find not only in formal
modes of expression like the dance, but also in our spontaneous

25

mind-body correlations between mood and appearance. It is to be
seen, for instance, in the erectness that goes with defiance, anger,

and confidence, or the skeletal droop that goes with dejection; or
the great variety of symbolic acts which psychologists have noted in
the conduct of both normal and abnormal persons. (Permanence

253)
Here Burke recognizes as symbolic action anything that can evoke external

“spontaneous mind-body correlations,” so internal rhetoric would also have to
include images, which are usually metaphorical in nature, and certainly emotion,

which is often the sole catalyst for both inner talk and imagery. The term “internal

rhetoric,” then, would have to encompass everything going on internally that
>

t

causes identification with one particular center rather than another; and

observing internal rhetoric would have to include noting everything, including
external body reactions to internal stimuli.
Viewing the self through the comic frame automatically puts one in a

center, an internal rhetorical position, a “sub-personality,” that allows for a
reaction to a situation far different from a center visited, and identified with, while

viewing life through the dramatic frame. Burke calls this, taking the “gloomy
route.” The inner rhetors, which belong to different “sub-personalities,” found
while using the comic frame are much better equipped to meet the challenges of

coping with everyday life, and consequently the comic frame is arguably one of
the greatest resources we can employ as a “salvation device” (Burke, Attitudes
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171). However, it is the intention of this thesis to explore a different kind of frame,

a frame that looks out from a center based on compassion—the empathic frame.
And although like the comic frame, this frame hinges on people being “observers

of themselves while acting," or people practicing observation of their internal
rhetoric, the goal is not personal use as a salvation device, but rather personal

use as a counter to the rhetoric and ethic of expediency.
If considering Burke’s comic frame assists in defining certain terms

relative to the empathic frame, considering Levinas’s “one big thing’’ should help

to illustrate its foundation. Simon Critchley, editor of The Cambridge Companion
to Levinas, tells us that “Levinas’s one big thing is expressed in his thesis that
ethics is first philosophy, where ethics is understood as a relation of infinite

responsibility to the other person" (6; emphasis added). He later states that

Levinas, prior to lecturing at the Sorbonne in the ‘70’s, was fond of repeating the
phrase "philosophy is the science of naiveties,” or, as Critchley explains,
“Philosophy is the work of reflection that is brought to bear on unreflective,
everyday life" (7; emphasis added). Combining these two definitions of how

Levinas viewed “ethics” and “philosophy” produces the following definition of the
phrase “ethics is first philosophy”: The relation of infinite responsibility to the
other person is first the work of reflection that is brought to bear on unreflective,
everyday life. This “work of reflection”--construed as conscious attention from a

compassionate center directed toward our internal rhetoric in order to identify
with other people-is the foundation of the empathic frame. And the empathic
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frame is meant as a direct counter to the internal rhetoric that leads to an ethic of
expediency.
Critchley directly addresses Levinas's overall perspective on the ethic of

expediency when he states, “Levinas’s point is that unless our social interactions
are underpinned by ethical relations to other persons, then the worst might

happen, that is, the failure to acknowledge the humanity of the other” (13).
Throughout history, the roots of the ethic of expediency have been fed by “failure-

to acknowledge the humanity of the other,” and we can safely assume that the
type of “ethical relations” Levinas refers to depend upon a philosophy that not

only lives “...as an act or practice..." (Critchley 9), but also consistently reflects
empathic judgment towards the other. Levinas not only believed in a philosophy
that lives, he defined as fundamentally “ethical” each “...event of being in relation
with the other...” ( 9). However, due to the ever-changing landscape of personal

human relations a philosophy that lives and ethical relations based on empathic
judgment will never be secure. Therefore, they both hinge on continual
examination of internal rhetoric concerning the other through a frame based on

compassion and a belief in the other’s fundamental value. Put another way,

examination of internal rhetoric, if it is to be done through an empathic frame,

would need to be done in the context of two of Levinas’s fundamental truths-that

human life has an absolute value, and that since there is no escaping being, we
all suffer.
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One key component, indispensable for the empathic frame, is the idea that
human life has an absolute value, and Levinas views this concept as a

fundamental truth. He shows us how the “separate existence” of the self “is

possible only because the Other also exists" (Davis 44; emphasis in original).
This fundamental truth is often considered for selfish reasons; for example, the
expedient business person who does realize his or her existence depends on

others, yet views them as valuable only in the same way a tool or commodity is
considered as valuable—as a resource for amassing monetary gain or power.
However, seen in a different light the absolute value of others is vital to the

empathic frame. If we owe our existence to others then we have an automatic
obligation to others, and Levinas calls that obligation “absolute responsibility.”
Just as the absolute value of human life is a given for Levinas, so is our

absolute responsibility, and in his idea of singularity we find a solid principle for
the empathic frame. Diane Perpcich, in The Ethics of Emanuel Levinas,
describes this principle when, she tells us that according to Levinas “The other

signifies outside of any horizon or contexts. She is a being who ‘counts as such’"
(44). The other has value whether or not I ascribe value, or for that matter

whether or not any other being ascribes value. Taking this idea to heart
t

J

increases the prospects for compassionate and productive examination of our
internal rhetoric due to the fact that the other’s singularity represents a polar

opposite to the ethic of expediency, which in direct contradiction to Levinas’s
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view demands that we ignore the humanity of other people in order to use them

as a means for personal or professional advancement

Levinas’s other fundamental reality that being is inescapable, which
causes, in a word, suffering, offers the other component or guiding principle of

the empathic frame. According to Perpich, “Levinas maintains that certain

philosophically neglected experiences, such as insomnia, fatigue, and suffering,
are... uniquely disclosive, though what they reveal is not ourfinitude.butthe

'elementary truth’ that being /s and there is no escaping it" (33). Even though

connecting the ideas that the other has absolute.value yet is born into a realm of

suffering brings with it an irony worthy of consideration through the comic frame,
it is certain that this thing that we all share-suffering—is vital for the formation of

an empathic frame. Keeping this "elementary truth" in sight while examining our

internal rhetoric concerning the other can automatically induce the empathic

frame since it almost forces sincere empathetic judgment. And, as is painfully

clear through the expedient actions of “the cult of dominance," empathetic
judgment, especially toward the working class, has become a rarity in the “free"

marketplace.
Levinas calls this idea of inexorable being with its consequent suffering an

“elementary truth,” and even armed with the arguments of post-modernity, where

there exists no universal truth, it’s hard to dispute his claim that if you are a
symbol-using animal, you suffer. This is not the way he puts it, however, the idea
is the same by virtue of the fact that we are animals. We cannot escape “being”
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and therefore we cannot escape suffering. The physicality of “being,” or being
bound to a human body, causes us all suffering on a physical level, and
possessing a brain capable of using symbols brings its own unique forms of

suffering on the emotional and psychological level. It truly is hard to argue
against this claim, yet this “elementary truth,” as unsettling as it might be, can be
utilized in efforts to identify with the other, particularly if the other suffers in a way
we ourselves have experienced firsthand.

It is now possible to refine the principles or components of the empathic
frame-The Absolute Value of Human Life and Inexorable Being and Consequent

Suffering—by refining the definition of Levinas’s “one big thing," specifically, what
he means by the term “responsibility.” Earlier, analyzing Critchley’s account of

Levinas’s “one big thing” produced a definition of “ethics is first philosophy" that

read: The relation of infinite responsibility to the other person is first the work of

reflection that is brought to bear on unreflective, everyday life. However, a closer
look at the term “responsibility” will change this definition, a change that directly

effects how the principles of the empathic frame are viewed. Levinas’s

perspective of “responsibility” is far different from the common meaning
associated with the term, especially what “is expressed in the well-known dictum

‘Ought implies can”’ (82); it is also considerably different from every other aspect
of the standard meaning given the term, in that for Levinas, responsibility is seen
as going “beyond what it is possible to do" (Perpich 83).
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Essentially, Levinas views “responsibility” as an appeal from one’s moral
conscience and Diane Perpich gives us a reliable explanation as to how his

perspective of the term is a “calculated inversion of the standard account” ( 83).
She tells us that for him, “[to] be infinitely responsible is to be ever on call, always

at one’s post, impaled upon one’s obligation, never quits with it, never with an
option to take a day or an hour or even a minute for one’s own cares” (84). This
seems like an intimidating declaration. However, we find on its heels the

announcement that “[when] Levinas uses the term ‘responsibility’ in the period of

Totality and Infinity it is more akin to the idea of a moral conscience than to the
discharge of a specific duty, though the latter notion plays a secondary role” (88).
And this is the statement that calls for an alteration of the previous definition of

“ethics is first philosophy"-an alteration that clarifies the principles of the
empathic frame because it shows they are actually parts of “a moral conscience.”

Taking Levinas’s view of “responsibility” into account calls for the final
definition of “ethics is first philosophy” to read-Trie relation of infinite moral
conscience toward the other person is first the work of reflection that is brought to

bear on unreflective, everyday life. This presents an impossible situation because
no matter how deep our reflection, or how sensitive to the other’s situation we

become, an “infinite moral conscience,” will always leave us thinking “I could do
more,” or as Levinas puts it, “This receding of the goal in the very measure one

approaches it is the life of conscience [ conscience morale ]” (Perpich 88).
However unattainable though, pursuit of the “infinite moral conscience” offers a
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solid approach to the empathic frame as a center in that it helps us realize the
elementary truth that “being is and there is no escaping it.” In fact, using the

principle of inexorable Being and Consequent Suffering while examining internal
rhetoric is tantamount to listening to the appeal of moral conscience, for as

Perpich states in her summation of a passage from Totality and Infinity, “One can

hear the other’s cry as a cry for aid only within .an already ethical orientation—
that is, from the perspective afforded by moral conscience” (90).

Likewise, pursuing Levinas’s view of “responsibility” helps us to realize the

fundamental truth that the other has intrinsic value because viewing the other
from “...the perspective afforded by moral conscience” is also equivalent to using

the principle of the Absolute Value of Human Life for the purposes of internal
inquiry. This type of “orientation” is exactly what Levinas is talking about when

he refers to the necessity of “social interactions ...underpinned by ethical
relations to other persons.” Avoiding “failure to acknowledge the humanity of the
other” hinges on pursuit of moral conscience regarding the other. To understand

its position as a principle in the empathic frame, and its importance as a counter

to internal expedient rhetoric toward the other, one needs only to contemplate
briefly the lack of value placed on humanity by those who employ only the

rhetoric and ethic of expediency. Through sociopathic tendencies, or motivations
based solely on self-interest and void of empathy of any kind, they assign very

little value to others, save using them for gain of one kind or another. Not
surprisingly, true expedient motivation-driven by an internal rhetoric that is
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completely void of moral conscience-absolutely interferes with consideration of
not only the other’s suffering, but also his or her value as a person, and

consequently, it leaves no room for empathic consideration.

Levinas’s perspective of responsibility not only helps refine the principles

of the empathic frame by showing they are components of moral conscience, but
it also fundamentally changes the idea of “infinite responsibility" to the other.

“Responsibility” can now be seen less as a solemn or severe commandment,

something that must be done, and more as the simple truth that we live through
conscience and that conscience is inexhaustible in two ways. First, one way or
the other, beyond choice, good or bad, we will always have an “ethical'

orientation” toward others, and second, moral conscience will always recede

“...in the same measure we approach it.” And, although Levinas’s view on

responsibility does offer a more refined understanding of the principles of the
empathic frame, the question that now arises is how to come up with a practical

method for application of this frame based on his theory that “ethics is first

philosophy”—a theory often criticized, and perhaps misunderstood, as
perfectionist. For an answer to this question, we can look back to Burke, who
ironically claims that one of humanity’s chief features is its penchant for being
“rotten with perfection.”
At first glance, Burke and Levinas appear to be polar opposites regarding

the term “perfection,” and this holds true in many areas. However, these two men

are very close in several of their core beliefs, and I intend to explore some of
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these beliefs in chapter three to more fully address the empathic frame as a tool

for countering the rhetoric and ethics of expediency. But for now, it is important to
consider one of Burke and Levinas’s biggest connections—the ethical moral
orientation of humanity—because Burke’s take on the subject leads to a

methodology for implementing the empathic frame.
It has already been noted that Levinas defined as fundamentally “ethical’’

each “...event of being in relation with the other...” (Critchley 9), that he believed

we are always, one way or another, in an “ethical orientation,” with the other. An
identical statement could be made about Burke, for he himself claims that

“[action] is fundamentally ethical, since it involves preferences. [...] The ethical

shapes our selection of means. It shapes our structures of orientation, while
these in turn shape the perceptions of the individuals born within the orientation”

(Permanence 250). According to Burke, from the time we are born we are
shaped by ethical considerations. “There are no negatives in nature,” he states,

“and...this ingenious addition to the universe is solely a product of human symbol

systems” (Language 9). In fact, he consigns the existence of humanity to our
natural connection with the negative when he tells us that human interaction has
always been moral interaction, although he does have difficulty proclaiming the

negative as an invention of man stating “...it might be more accurate to say that
language and the negative ‘invented’ man” (9). In any case, William H. Rueckert
states that the “moral-ethical” is for Burke “...the primary underlying motive or set

of motives that activates all men’” (48). Here Burke not only agrees with Levinas
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that moral conscience is inescapable, he also claims that it is the underlying

motivation “that activates all men.” Looking from here to Burke’s views on

examination of motivation not only highlights another connection with Levinas,
but also suggests a practical method for application of the empathic frame.
Burke’s concept of examination of motivation falls right in line with

Levinas’s idea that the relation of infinite moral conscience toward the other

person is first the work of reflection that is brought to bear on unreflective,
everyday life. In “the Question of Kenneth Burke’s Ethics,” Timothy W. Crusius

offers not only an outline of what Burkean ethics might look like, but also specific

instructions on how we might progress in “...the work of reflection.” Or, for use in
the empathic frame, how we might examine our internal rhetoric to discover how

it leads to various motivations in connection with others.
“Instead of wasting time pursuing abstractions like the Right and the

Good,” he says, “we must flesh out, be as concrete and detailed as we can,

about an ethics based on understanding ourselves as ‘symbol-using animals.”

He goes on to say, “[if] we can’t learn to recognize and control our symbol-driven
motives, how can we be ethical?” (4). Nobody lives in a vacuum. Consequently

our “symbol-driven motives” are almost always connected in some way to other

human beings. In his discussion of Burke’s ethics, Crusius’s words, as simple as
they may sound at first, are just as exacting as those of Levinas when he talks of
“...going beyond what it is possible to do.” However, his words also offer a strong
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suggestion as to how we might go about examining our internal rhetoric, and the

motivation it creates, through the empathic frame.
To be as “concrete and detailed as we can" means something. It means

when engaged in reflection on our internal rhetoric concerning the other we
should refrain from vague generalizations and record exactly what is witnessed.
When viewing the internal places we consistently visit while considering the

other, and listening to the rhetoric we consistently employ in our internal relations
with others, we must be specific. The words “concrete” and “detailed” mean that

attention must be paid to all places, all rhetoric, particularly the cynical rhetoric in
those dismal inner places that can, if not brought up to a conscious level, cause .

us to completely identify with and wallow in a variety of negative states,
especially if we were “born within the orientation” of enjoying negative, dramatic

rhetoric—the orientation of the dramatic frame. "Concrete” and “detailed” implies
impartiality or at least some form of detachment during examination of internal
rhetoric. And for use in the empathic frame, these words mean a sense of honest

objectivity concerning one’s inner treatment of the other. They mean truth with

oneself about one’s internal rhetoric, attitude, and motivation when it comes to
the other. Recognizing that we need to be “as concrete and detailed” as we can •

about our “ethical orientation” toward others is the first step in “fleshing out” our

reflection that is brought to bear on unreflective, everyday life suggesting small
steps are necessary to build on Levinas’s foundation.
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In his essay, “Kenneth Burke’s Theory," Daniel Fogarty states that in

Burke’s thought there is “an essential connection between language and the
nature of man," and that man “translates with the help of his symbol-making

power," everything, and “always in terms of the order he is building. For Burke,

the whole range of this activity, from a man’s inner, subconscious conflict to the
highest kind of conscious abstraction, is rhetoric” (325). The concern here is our
internal rhetoric and the order it is building. The concern is how our internal

rhetoric “shapes our selection of means"—how it creates our “structures of
orientation” towards the other, and since examination of internal rhetoric is truly
an autonomous activity, it is fitting to look at Burke’s discussion on “Identification

and the ‘Autonomous”’ for information on moving beyond the first step of

recognizing what we need to do to build on Levinas’s foundation.

Opening his discussion on “Identification and the ‘Autonomous’” Burke
states, “As regards ‘autonomous’ activities, the principle of Rhetorical
identification may be summed up thus: The fact that an activity is capable of

reduction to intrinsic, autonomous principles does not argue that it is free from
identification with other orders of motivation extrinsic to it” (Rhetoric 27). He then

goes on to explain how “[the] human agent, qua human agent, is not motivated

solely by the principles of a specialized activity,” offering as an example the
“shepherd qua shepherd” who, acting for the good of the sheep in a protective

manner, may also be “identified” with the business end of selling them at the

market. He continues from another angle with an explanation of how “the
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principles of the autonomous activity can be considered irrespective of such

identifications...,” by calling attention to how a “specialized subject" taught in the

same classroom to two different students can, later in their lives, be incorporated
in completely different manners. However, with the following statement, Burke
enters an area of autonomous activity that clearly illustrates practical examination

of inner symbolic action in relation to the other:
Carried into unique cases, such concerns with identifications leads

to the sheer ‘identities’ of Symbolic. That is, we are in pure
Symbolic when we concentrate upon one particular integrated

structure of motives. But we are clearly in the region of. rhetoric
when considering the identifications whereby a specialized activity
makes one a participant in some social or economic class. (27-28)
Defining “pure Symbolic" in the above passage forces consideration of the
Symbolic qua Symbolic, or the Symbolic as being Symbolic, in which case if we

are “in pure Symbolic,” then at the moment of concentration on a single

“integrated structure of motives,” we are the Symbolic, for, according to Burke,

only our species has the ability to produce the Symbolic. However, practically
speaking, it doesn’t matter how the phrase “in pure Symbolic" is perceived
because one thing is certain. We are not “in the region, of rhetoric.” And, if we are

not “in the region of rhetoric," then we are not attempting to persuade ourselves
<

' of one thing or the other and we are not identified with one thing or the other,

except, of course, the “pure Symbolic." In this’ state, we are objectively
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concentrating on “one particular integrated structure of motives.” We are

objectively analyzing one area of internal rhetoric. It is this idea of objective

observance of a single “integrated structure” that proves most useful for
application of Levinas’s basic belief that we need to reflect on “unreflective,
everyday life.” Levinas’s “one big thing” supplies the tall order, while Burke,

advocating small steps toward that tall order, gives us solid directions for
progress, directions that call for objectively addressing our “integrated structures”

of motivation one by one.
The implication of Burke’s idea concerning zeroing in or shining a light on

“one particular integrated structure of motives” is that we do, in fact, possess

many integrated structures of motives. To begin addressing this idea, so
important to examination of internal rhetoric through the empathic frame, we
need look no further than to the above briefly mentioned quotation concerning

the “region of rhetoric.” Burke states “...we are clearly in the region of rhetoric
when considering the identifications whereby a specialized activity makes one a

participant in some social or economic class. ‘Belonging’ in this sense is
rhetorical” (Rhetoric 28). One of the most interesting ideas produced by
considering this subject of “belonging” in a rhetorical sense to a group is that it
can be applied to different inner structures of motives. Looking at some of these

structures as ‘rival factions,’ trying to deal with the stresses of everyday life and

producing their own special brands of symbolic action in us, furthers the
groundwork for shining a light on one single structure.
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According to Rueckert “Burke and others" tell us that “the self, some
mysterious and irreducible core of being, some changeless yet changing identity,

is, in its growth, constantly subjected to radical pressures from within and without

in the form of biological and neurological changes..." (43). These radical
pressures spare none, particularly during times like these when the rhetoric and
ethics of expediency run rampant, and just as in Levinas’s "fundamental truth”

that we all suffer we find here ample reason to believe that in one degree or
another we all must live with a certain amount of neurosis due to suffering.

Addressing the subject of neurosis, Burke states, “[rhetorically], the neurotic’s
every attempt to legislate for his own conduct is disorganized by rival factions

within his own dissociated self” (Rhetoric 230). One need only reflect with
sincerity back to a ‘bad day’ ruled by ‘rival factions’ of the dissociated self to
appreciate that they are structured through their own particular rhetoric, they are

many, and they are motivated. There is also a consistency to their structure that
is noticeable over a period of time.

Of further interest in this area of looking at structures of integrated motives
as “rival factions” in the dissociated self is Rueckert’s statement that “[the] self

identifies with one thing or another, consciously or unconsciously; it accepts and
rejects various alternatives, merges with and separates from certain things; its
growth is the drama of ethical choice and its ideal is that unity of being which
constitutes the forward moving self’ (43). Although this entire concept would be

useful in any conversation concerning the relationship between ethics and
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internal rhetoric, it is the phrase “consciously or unconsciously” that is compelling

when considering the “rival factions of the dissociated self.” Burke would be the
first to agree that we cannot leave identification with one terministic screen
without coming under the influence of another, and the act of sincere reflection

on one specific inner faction, and the rhetoric it uses, automatically puts us in a

place of observation that is more conscious than the faction whose rhetoric we
are objectively analyzing. It is more conscious by the fact that it is associating the

particular faction with the self, seeing it as a part of the self rather than going
with it blindly, totally identifying with it unconsciously, and consequently believing
that that faction /s the self.

When we become observers of “rival factions” we are essentially splitting

the self in two, and since the topic of this chapter is reflection on the symbolic
action of internal rhetoric in order to identify or empathize with the other, it is

important to discuss “the self’ further. More specifically, it is important to take a
look at the place we occupy while reflecting on our rhetorical positions

concerning the other. Two of the aspects of the reflective attitude—objectivity
and sincerity--have already been discussed, and they will be addressed more

fully in chapter three. And more attention will be paid to the empathic frame of
recognition that we all suffer, and that the other is a “being who counts as such.”
Prior to chapter three however, it makes sense to briefly discuss the postmodern

concept of the decentered subject and Burke’s take on the idea of “centers,”
since they are closely connected to the idea of reaching a specific center,
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through the empathic frame, that identifies with the other and consequently acts
as a counter to the rhetoric and ethics-of expediency.

At the start of a concise and informative paragraph explaining Burke’s

relationship with postmodern theory, Timothy Crusius states, “[postmodern]
thought is marked by a healthy regard for otherness, and consequently a

pervasive animus toward ‘centricities,’ ego-, ethno-, phaio-, logo-, and so forth”
(Kenneth Burke 138). However, there is obviously an ample supply of
postmodern thinkers who steer the logical argument for the relativity-of-

everything outside its practical limits because, after Crusius verifies “...the
postmodern commitments of [Burke’s]’philosophy,” he quickly adds that “Burke
understands the dialectic of difference better than most postmodernists do"
(138), and he goes on to explain why.

According to Crusius, Burke not only believed that “we can only encounter
otherness from our own prejudices,” but he also taught the common sense need

to recognize just where the logical argument of relativism rationally ends up.
Summing up Burke’s perspective on the “dialectic of difference," Crusius brings

up one of Burke’s core beliefs: “[there] is...no escape from ‘centricty’ of some
kind, as there is no escape from terministic screens of some sort’ (138; emphasis

in original). Throughout his life, one of Burke’s main goals was to “purify war" with

the other, to promote a “dialogue in good faith,” a “successful dialogue..., a
discussion that clarifies differences and discovers common ground, shared
understandings..." (Crusius Kenneth Burke 19). Long before the quandary ■
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foisted upon the subject by postmodern relativism, Burke knew that in order for
the other and the individual to move forward toward a better life, the individual

must first understand that “[decentering] is not dis-integration: to decenter is to
move to a revised center.” He knew that any discussion that degenerates to
“mere relativism” is just so much useless circling around, and he definitely knew
that “[the] question is not, Shall we have a center? but rather, What kind of center
shall we have?” (138). His perspective is practical, and practically speaking,
especially in regard to the other, the question, What kind of center shall I have? •

is of utmost importance. This question will be one of the central areas of
exploration in chapter 3.
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CHAPTERTHREE
THE SELF: A CONTAINER OF CONSCIOUS .

AND UNCONSCIOUS RHETORS

In this chapter, I will explore the idea of “the self’ as a sort of container
that releases “structures of integrated motives," consciously or unconsciously,

and also the idea that to successfully counter expedient internal rhetoric we need

to choose a “center" in relation to the other consciously. I will address the
unconscious rhetoric jabbering away from the vast and varied dissociated self,

the automatons, the robotic members of the internal cast who offer a lifetime of
study, study that, according to Burke is best done sincerely, objectively, and with
humor.
In a short essay titled “Dramatic and Philosophic Terms for Essence” from

A Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke discusses two opposite ways of viewing

essence — “the ancestral" and “the final." “The ancestral" perspective is based
on the idea that “... a thing’s essence can be translated into a temporal or

narrative equivalent by statement in terms of the thing’s source or beginnings...”
(13). Pointing to “the final,” or “the essence of a thing ...defined narratively in
I

terms of its fulfillment or fruition,” Burke, states: “Metaphysically, this formal

principle gets its best-rounded expression in the Aristotelian entelechy, which
classifies a thing by conceiving of its kind according to the perfection (that is,

finishedness)'of which that kind is capable". (13—14; emphasis in original). He
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further states that by using this principle, “...the essence of a motive” can be
determined “...naratively or dramatically (in terms of its history) by showing how

that motive ended...’’ (emphasis in original). Or, putting it in the simplest of terms

— “By its fruition, we should judge it” (14). This principle reinforces the

Lexicological Response to expedient rhetoric by expanding its use beyond the
immediate moment. In other words, it helps one come to terms with the reality
that certain people with a very long history of spewing expedient rhetoric have

“...[‘frozen] at a simpler stage of development...” (Burke Attitudes 184), and are

consequently, through self-definition over years, incapable of change. Their

“...attitude has attained full rationalization," and according to Burke, this type

would have to face too much inner conflict among their disassociated rhetors to
experience any meaningful change.

To offer a contemporary example: “the perfection... of which [Rush
Limbaugh’s] kind is capable" lies in the realm of self-destruction, or putting it in

what Burke calls “temporal terms" I would say, “he will self-destruct” Just
recently Limbaugh came close—once again—to destruction at the hands of his

own nature by calling a young woman a whore, and the U.S. Taxpayer her
unwitting pimp. It made no difference to Limbaugh that she was in reality a thirdyear law student arguing a case for women’s health issues on the floor of

Congress.
A certain irony can be found in the fact that this far-right of center Grand

American Orator (“the harbinger of truth” to millions), botched his tirade while
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trying to use the Lexicological Response to bolster his position. Yet, his diatribe
was no more than an attempt to trick by deflection. “What does that make her?’’

he kept repeating, ignoring the real case the woman was making. Limbaugh
twisted her argument into such outrageous terms that even his backers refused

to concur with his afflicted logic that the women, by simply presenting her case,

had defined herself as a whore. Limbaugh unfortunately continues on,

unimpeded by conscience and recognizing only the same force recognized by his
sponsors: loss-or—gain-of-revenue. Many small-minded rhetors who have
“frozen in a simpler stage of development” seem to relish trying to get away with
tricks like this, and Kenneth Burke is kinder than I am. 1 see rhetors like

Limbaugh as having crystallized out at a despicable stage of development, and

feel a very real antipathy toward them. And my antipathy gets in the way of my
empathy, which has an obviously negative effect on my ability to employ the

empathic frame while considering people like Limbaugh.
1 am aware of the fact that the anger in the rhetoric above does not
conform to the expectations we have about academic discourse; however, I have

chosen not to mask the anger because my personal reaction will help illustrate

Burke’s suggestion that “watching" inner symbolic activity or rhetoric has practical
value. Observing “sub-personalities” inclined toward anger, or for that matter,

watching any negative inner activity regarding another, is pragmatic. Just

becoming aware of an angry internal rhetor can oftentimes lead to freedom from
it, at least temporarily. However, watching often only works for a short while, after
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which another negative member of the disassociated self demands attention.
Between those moments though a conscious decision to enlist the aid of

members from our internal cast that view life through the comic frame can offer
more than a temporary release from our self-imposed anguish by opening the

door to the empathic frame. Simply put, under certain circumstances, use of the

comic frame can lead to the empathic frame.

For instance, this technique (using the comic frame to reach the empathic
frame) was employed during the initial stages of my own anger-laden response

to Limbaugh’s latest outrage. While searching for those internal rhetors who
prefer to see life differently, I realized that Limbaugh suffers far more than I do,

and I am happy to report that I was able set him free for more than just a
moment. At the same time, I realized that he suffers more than I do because he

has an “attitude that has.attained full rationalization,"and since his being has
crystallized out, it is not in his history or in his nature to acknowledge his own
foibles—while I on the other hand, freely admit to many.

To speak out against disgusting rhetoric that also disturbs one’s peers is
easy since there is always a readily available source of uplifting moral support

and even commiseration when necessary. However, speaking out against a
perspective that is accepted and shared by one’s peers presents a different set

of circumstances, and this thesis has a special interest in one such perspective
because it directly affects one of the topics under discussion, specifically finding

a way to re-view postmodern relativism and the question as to whether we can

48

"even talk about truth.” I believe this particular perspective—concerning whether
we can or cannot even discuss terms such as “truth”—not only successfully puts
the damper on philosophy in the rhetorical conversation, but it also impedes the
conversation to the point of stagnation at times.

In the academy, “can we even talk about truth” acts as a convention, an
unwritten rule that effectively blocks conversation concerning conscience. It has

become an ideology in every sense of the word as defined by Burke in Language
as Symbolic Action, when he asks:
Do we use words or do they simply use us? An ‘ideology’ is like a

god coming down to earth, where it will inhabit a place pervaded by

its presence. An ‘ideology is like a spirit taking up its abode in a
body: it makes that body hop around in certain ways; and that same
body would have hopped around in different ways had a different

ideology happened to inhabit it. (6)

Through the spirit of postmodern rhetoric into the air of the academy, this

idea/ideology enters the minds of students unimpeded, and Barbara Johnstone

sums it up in the following quote from Discourse Analysis:
If all discourse is multi-voiced, the result of an endless and

probably untraceable series of appropriations, borrowings,

repetitions, variations on themes, then who is responsible for the
truth of what gets said or written, or for the accuracy of an
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interpretation? Can we even talk about “truth" and “accuracy"?

(193)

I read the chapter containing this perspective during my final course; however,
long before that—throughout the Master’s Program in fact—I felt frustrated by

the conventional “wisdom” of this postmodern ideology, which I believe has been
over-peddled, oversold, and if left unchallenged will become even more
dangerous.

The way Johnstone words her question the implication is clear. No, we

cannot talk about “truth." No, we cannot talk about “accuracy.” In fact, we
cannot talk about any abstract human concept that defines or judges quality, and
we certainly cannot talk about the place that gives birth to abstract human

concepts that judge quality: the “conscience." One of the goals of this thesis is to

suggest that we can talk about the place that gives birth to abstract human
concepts that judge quality. And we can do it in a way that should satisfy

postmodernists if we view conscience as a “center” we choose, a frame we look
through in relation to the other. I believe we should also be able to figure out

ways to talk about things like “truth," and “accuracy,” because if we do not, then

the mindset of “greed’ continues to get a free ride without opposition.
During my program, I encountered many students who felt a strong
allegiance to the ideology implied by Johnstone’s question, so many.in fact, that I

wondered more than once how an idea that supposedly enhances critical
thinking had become almost universally accepted. I believe one such encounter
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is a particularly pertinent illustration of the difficulties anyone can face while trying
to resist the de facto law of “No we can’t” and enter into a conversation

concerning ‘conscience’ in the postmodern classroom. It began on the list-serve
Blackboard during the beginning of English 611—a study of the history of

rhetoric based on the text The Rhetorical Tradition.
The course began with the subject of sophistry and Gorgias’s Encomium

of Helen took center stage almost immediately. Over the course of several days,

a large number of posts appeared on Blackboard under the heading, “Sophistry-

-the classical kind,” and I contributed some general comments concerning my
thoughts at the time on the subject
I began by citing from a criticism of the sophists titled “Against the

Sophists” by Isocrates stating, “a nutshell argument against their way of thinking
claims that ‘their interest was not in the triumph of justice but in making ‘the
worse reason appear the better’” (footnote 12, 73). I added “...that it might be
kinder to say that they had a passion for cleverness rather than a passion for

truth, much like participants in the modern day “adversarial trial system in the
United States....” I continued by saying that although a passion for cleverness

can advance both the pathos and logos of one’s rhetorical presentations, it can
damage the ethos of a rhetor because outside the courtroom, “in the simpler
world of personal affairs, interest in cleverness above truth will eventually cause
others to perceive us as unworthy of trust. And being perceived as unworthy of
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trust is probably the most damaging thing one’s ethos can face” (Morrow,
Blackboard, Jan. 16, 2010).

A counter argument to my post claimed that I had “mentioned” Gorgias,
and said his “appeal [was] not particularly appealing to the ethos.” It further
claimed that Gorgias’s ability to deceive was vindicated because he “...effectively
used it to attain students who otherwise might have remained ignorant of

rhetorical approaches.” However, what followed was a statement that thoroughly
caught my attention. “Without such individuals,” this writer claimed, “the state

could not run efficiently, etc.” My response to this post focused mainly on the
later statement, which was when I brought the word “conscience” into the

discussion.
I did start by saying that “...it is highly debatable whether a reputation for

deceit is an asset to one’s ethos;” however, I devoted most of my response to the
idea that citizens who are well-trained in “rhetorical approaches” do not

guarantee that a state will run efficiently. I suggested that our nation was not

running efficiently at all, and that “some of the most rhetorically trained men and

women of our day are responsible for the mess we’re in right now.” I said that we
were full to overflowing with highly trained television news reporters who lied,
well-educated corporate owned attorneys who lied, and extremely well-paid
lobbyists who entertained while they lied. I was trying to make the point that

“without enough attention paid to conscience, knowing 'rhetorical approaches’

can be a very dangerous thing, for all of us.”
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Directly after my commentary, a third student joined in the conversation

stating the following:
I agree with your counter-argument and offer Josef Goebbels as
one of the best rhetoricians of his time, and yet an evil, dangerous
man with a hideous agenda perpetuating horrific ideas. Rhetoric

without ethics, without a conscience has been and will continue to
be the downfall of mankind. It is easy to follow a great orator as one

is being led down a path of immorality. After all, the arguments
were sound, the applause plentiful. Gerry, you are absolutely right

to point out the dangers as you have. (Morgan, name changed to
protect privacy, January ,18, 2010)
At this point, I think a word about this respondent, Jane Morgan, is in order. Jane

was born and raised in Germany and knows better than most the dangerous

power of expedient rhetoric. The expedient rhetoric she is talking about—that of
Josef Goebbels—was the same expedient rhetoric that led to so much grief in
the life of Emmanuel Levinas, and of course, truly countless others. A mature
teacher of adolescents, Jane has also seen her share of thoughtless adolescent

action—the kind too quick for consultation of conscience. I honestly thought that
her remarks would be the end of the conversation; however, two more comments

were posted, one by the first respondent and one by me.
The first respondent had a very real problem with the way Jane and I were

using the word “conscience” and clearly stated so. Her main objection was not
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simply reminiscent of postmodern arguments against discussing abstract ideas
[ike conscience—it was a textbook argument, it was a parroting of the Johnstone
citation 1 brought up earlier, and it began with a statement about how both Jane

Morgan’s argument and mine"... [hinged] on the ability to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that conscience is innate.” It then went on to say our
perspective was only an opinion, that there were “different views” on the matter,

and that conscience was not, “as Plato would have us believe” universally agreed

upon. If the respondent had just come right out and said directly, “How can we
even talk about ‘conscience?’” I would not have been surprised.

Since the ideas put forth in this discussion are vital to my thesis,
particularly my final entry, 1 will cite that response in total:

1 agree with you. Conscience is a slippery word. It runs the length

and breadth of human experience. There are sociopaths and

psychopaths that have absolutely no conscience and could care
less about things like “compassion,” or “truth,” and on the other end

of the spectrum there are people like Mother Theresa and Father
Damien, who by all reports actually enjoyed a life of service to
humanity. But, the kind of conscience I’m talking about is the kind

that nips at us one way or another when we know we’ve cheated

someone, or lied, or stolen. The kind of conscience that would be

expected of students—the class of people I thought we were
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talking about—students, who are expected to adhere to the policy

built around the “plagiarism/academic dishonesty’’ thing.
All I’m saying is that it is important to foster this sort of conscience

in students and maybe the best way to get that point'across is to try

to illustrate it with something I know about myself. If I were forced to
choose between being a prosecutor or a public defender, I would
choose to be a prosecutor. And the reason is simple. A prosecutor

has a choice about whether or not a case should be filed against
someone, and so has the option to exercise his or her conscience.

A public defender on the other hand, may be commanded by the

court to defend a rapist he or she knows is guilty, and have no
choice in the matter. But the real point is that I don’t just think, or
believe, or know, I understand to the marrow of my bones that an

attorney who has ‘justice’ in mind is by far better for the human
condition than an attorney who prides him or herself on winning due

to skill in rhetorical moves. Take that public defender ordered to
defend the rapist. How would you feel, really, think about it, if you
found out that that attorney’s pride was satiated by winning the
case without giving a damn that a rapist went free? That’s also the

kind of conscience I’m talking about. The kind that is offended by
injustice. By the way, where’d you hear that Plato ‘would have" us
believe’ that conscience is universally agreed upon?
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Although I did not know the young woman who had a problem with the
discussion of conscience at the time of our Blackboard posts, 1 did subsequently
get to know her fairly well. We never discussed our differences, but rather talked
more on a personal level with each other. We had a mutual respect for each

other, and a mutual understanding that our immersion in competing ideologies
was no reason to take offense. Since one of Burke’s primary goals was to purify

war, I think he would have enjoyed the result of our friendly conversations. She is

not only a brilliant student, but also sensitive, kind, and likable—a good person.

Over twenty years ago, in Fragments of Rationality Postmodemity and the
Subject of Composition, Lester Faigley pointed out how “The instability of the
subject in postmodern theory is one aspect of the ‘impasse’ of postmodern

theory.” Clarifying this statement, he goes on to say that the cause of the
impasse is due to the postmodern idea that “[the] subject, like judgments of value

and validations, has no grounding outside contingent discourses” (227). Marilyn
Cooper referred to this same interval in postmodern history as “a period of

legitimation crisis where there is no universally accepted external authority to

appeal to nor any way to establish universal or enduring values...” (150). Toward
the end of the Master’s program I began to understand that a renewed interest in
philosophers like Burke and Levinas could spark a revival of ethics in the

discussion of rhetoric, that things may be changing. However, during the
program, my experience of the discussion fell more into the categories described
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by Faigley and Cooper, especially that any idea concerning “judgments of value
and validations" could not even be brought up.

The end of Philosophy in the discussion of rhetoric means the end of
philosophy in the discussion, for the implication of the question “Can'we even talk

about 'truth’ and ‘accuracy’?’’ still seems to be at the bottom of the conversation.
Practically speaking, from my own experience in the program, we are still at an
impasse due to an idea/ideology that is meant to enhance critical thinking, yet

ironically seems to be accepted without much thought at all. Many students still
seem to believe that any conversation about abstract ideas such as ‘truth,’

‘accuracy,’ or ‘conscience’ cannot even be brought to the table.
At the end of a chapter titled “The Ethical Subject,” while discussing
‘Ethics and Postmodern Pedagogy,’ Faigley argues from the perspective of Jean

Francois Lyotard:

Bringing ethics into rhetoric is not a matter of collapsing spectacular
diversity into universal truth. Neither is ethics only a matter of a

radical questioning of what aspires to be regarded as truth. Lyotard
insists that ethics is also the obligation of rhetoric. It is accepting

the responsibility for judgment. It is a pausing to reflect on the limits
of understanding. It is a respect for diversity and unassimilated
otherness. It is finding spaces to listen.
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“Accepting the responsibility for judgment” begs the question: from what aspect

of our nature do we make ethical judgments? I submit it is the conscience, the
seat of moral-ethical judgment.
Burke is well-known for his belief that language through the negative

created man, and that our being is “fundamentally moral-ethical.” In fact,

.

Crusius claims “...any notion of “post ethical man” is for Burke a contradiction in
terms. Individual persons may be amoral, able to resist or ignore all moral

injunctions and prohibitions—we call them psychopaths—but human being
would simply cease to be human being without ethics” (The Conversation...']59).

Levinas too “most assuredly” believed that “...ethics is conceived...as that which
breaks with nature and is the advent of the human..." (Perpich 107). The

moral/ethical is not just part of our nature; it is the result of our ability to use
language, symbols—the moral/ethical makes us what we are. Burke also
believed that “...the end of Philosophy did not mean the end of philosophy.

Rather the “postmodern condition" is the setting of a problem, a challenge to find

a way of doing philosophy in an intellectual environment fortified to resist ‘grand
theory’ or ‘master narratives’" (Crusius Kenneth Burke 2; emphasis added).

Granted, not everyone’s conscience is the same. However, if we can start
looking at conscience as akin to something like the empathic frame, a center

among centers to choose from, a frame among frames, then we can at least see
the discussion of conscience as conforming with postmodern rhetorical theory

and we can meet the challenge Burke places before us. Adding conscience in
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these terms could in turn lead to discussing ethical judgment more freely. Also, if

we begin looking at the “self’ as a container, consciously or unconsciously
releasing a variety of internal rhetors, we can begin discussing the “self and the

use of different frames or centers more easily.
With these ideas in mind, I would like to answer Barbara Johnstone’s

rhetorical question with a rhetorical question of my own: Especially in times like
these, when the rhetoric and ethics of expediency persistently tries to rule our

day-to-day life, how can we not talk about “truth,” or “accuracy,” or “justice,” or
“conscience"? Not only are our personal relations with others at stake but during

this period of unbridled expedient rhetoric, the fate of our society is at stake.
Looking at the self as a container that releases ‘structures of integrated motives,’
or internal rhetors, consciously or unconsciously, and exploring the idea that we
need to choose a center in relation to the other consciously can lead to

identification with internal rhetors who desire identification with the other. And in

this area, the postmodern idea of the dissociated self supplies only half the story.
Burke, in his discussion concerning his own internal rhetoricians, clearly

illustrates associated selves within—members of his own internal cast of rhetors
bent on cooperation with a positive goal in mind. We all have such associated
selves within, and not only the kind that are interested in figuring out specific

problems in rhetorical theory. We also have internal rhetors dedicated to a variety
of frames or centers. Some of these frames or centers we choose consciously
and some we do not. People who unconsciously choose centers that know only
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the language of self-interest who run into other people who are unconsciously
choosing similar centers are the cause of Burke’s Abyss—the totally

unconscious use of language in the “human barnyard.” Regarding the individual,

Burke claims, a means of salvation from this Tower of Babel, lies in consciously
choosing the frame occupied by rhetors who speak the language of comedy. And
I suggest that regarding the other, the practice of “watching” internal rhetors, in
order to make a conscious decision to go with those who identify with the
empathic frame could lead to a better life for not only the other but also the

individual. 1 would further suggest that empathic identification with the other is,

and always has been, the way of forward movement in the public sphere.
In the introduction to “Peace and Proximity,” the editors of Emmanuel

Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings state that the fundamental concentration of

his philosophy—the face-to-face relationship—has been criticized for having
little relevance to advances in the public sphere. They say the practicality of his

reasoning has been questioned. They say his critics have asked, “What is the
relation between the face-to-face and the spheres of reason, law, justice, and
universality, spheres which, in the Western liberal tradition at least, are at the

basis of the political organization of society [...] In brief, what is the relation
between ethics and politics?” (Perperzak 161). However, I find his critics did
more than just question Levinas’s philosophy as impractical. According to Diane
Perpich, some attacked him by trying to upend his perspective one hundred and

eighty degrees. She quotes Richard Rorty as one such critic who said that
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Levinas’s primary focus, infinite responsibility to the other, was actually a
“...stumbling-block to effective political organization as in the sense of sin" (5).
The editors’ response to such critics is that
Levinas does not want to reject the order of political rationality and

its consequent claims to universality and justice, rather, he wants to
criticize the belief that only political rationality can answer political

problems and to show how the order of the state rests upon the
irreducible ethical responsibility of the face-to-face relation. (161;

emphasis in original)

Levinas holds great stock in the idea that the order of the state works from the

bottom up and that ethical responsibility in “the face-to-face” is ultimately
the key to civic progress. Burke sees it essentially the same way.
At the foundation of Burke’s philosophy of Dramatism we find the absolute

necessity of seeing humans as “persons acting” rather than “things in motion.”

However, always willing to take the other side of the argument into account he
states, “Maybe we are but things in motion...! am even willing to grant that the

distinction between things moving and persons acting is but an illusion. All I
would claim is that illusion or not, the human race cannot possible get along with

itself on the basis of any other intuition” (Language 53; emphasis in original). He

also states, “The progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than in
picturing people not as vicious, but as mistaken” (Attitudes 41; emphasis in

original). Crusius adds to this the idea that “We can’t know the Truth about
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human beings. We can, however, be wise enough to see that we must picture
people as mistaken rather than vicious to sustain human society. And without

society, we are nothing” (Kenneth Burke 202). These citations clearly point to the
idea that both Burke and Levinas see ethical responsibility to the other as a

fundamental necessity for progress in the public sphere, and I would add, that

Burke, like Levinas, devoted much of his work advocating self-reflection as a tool
for discovering just what one’s responsibility toward the other might be. Much of
his philosophy is directly related to comprehending our internal motivation
concerning the other. In fact, Crusius states, “[Burke’s] entire philosophical

anthropology is meant...to expose the problem of problems for symbol-using
animals, how to attain a measure of understanding and control over our own

symbol-driven motives” (153; emphasis in original).
The stability of the state? Ultimately, both Levinas and Burke say that it is
I

up to us—on an individual level, which means not only work toward political

progress but also more importantly, work on ourselves. According to both, we
cannot take the easy way and work for advancement on the political level, the

only kind of work Rorty apparently thinks is necessary. I choose to listen to Burke
and Levinas, who support the idea that the real way to progress both politically

and individually lies in breaking free of the dissociated self, consciously choosing

a frame within, and going with those internal rhetors who talk a language different
from that of self-centeredness. I choose to listen to Burke and Levinas, who

advocate finding those internal rhetors who support tuning into the other,
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becoming identified with the other, being empathic toward the other. And 1

obviously agree with Burke that we have a choice in the matter of which internal
rhetors we go with.

’ Burke’s rhetorical theory can help us see both our disassociated rhetors

and our “partisan rhetors.” His definition of Man is entirely devoted to the
dissociated rhetors in each of us who together make up our society, the “Tower

of Babel”— those who insist on the dramatic frame, which leads inevitably to the

expedient mindset, the “cult of the kill.” However, his references to the partisan
rhetors of the associated self are less conspicuous, or esoteric in nature, as are

his references of how easy it is to lose contact with the associated self. The

following citation from “Rhetoric of ‘Address’ (to the individual soul)" is perhaps
one of the best descriptions of how “watching” or becoming “observers of
[ourselves]" can unearth the internal rhetoric of the dissociated self, which, by

design, blocks access to the associated self:
...a modern “post-Christian” rhetoric must...concern itself with the

thought that, under the heading of appeal to audiences, would also
be included any ideas or images privately addressed to the

individual self for moralistic or incantatory purposes. For you

become your own audience, in some respects a very lax one, in
some respects very exacting, when you become involved in

psychologically stylistic subterfuges for presenting your own case to
yourself in sympathetic terms (and even terms that seem harsh can
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often be found on closer scrutiny to be flattering, as with neurotics

who visit sufferings upon themselves in the name of very highpowered motives which whatever their discomfiture, feed pride.
(Rhetoric 38-39)

All my adult life 1 have wrestled with “psychologically stylistic subterfuges for
presenting [my] own case to [myself] in sympathetic terms.” In fact, the self
justification born of this practice is probably the primary blockade to accessing

the comic frame, the empathic frame, or the associated self. For the purpose of

clarifying one way to reach the empathic or the comic frame, a way that works for
me, I would like to introduce a poem I wrote some years ago, which was re

worked for this thesis. It is about using “stylistic subterfuges” and "becoming my

own audience.” It is about “high-powered motives” set into motion through
identification with my own internal rhetoric. This poem is essentially about

feeding pride.

Into The Basement
And Out

Again

everybody has to go into the basement
eventually

my last trip I saw enough to last for a long time.
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a ray of effort...
fell on the one born of injury who identifies with the rhetoric of fear’

the one born of fear who identifies with the rhetoric of anger
the one bom of anger who identifies with the rhetoric of suspicion

the one born of suspicion who identifies with the rhetoric of skepticism
the one born of skepticism who identifies with the rhetoric of judgment,
the one born of judgment who identifies with the rhetoric of criticism
the one born of criticism who identifies with the rhetoric of self-satisfaction
the one born of self-satisfaction who identifies with the rhetoric of vanity

the one born of vanity who identifies with the rhetoric of pride...

And then, as always in the pinpoint beam in the basement,

the kindly judge
steps from the shadows

and points a finger directly at me arid
I am criticized in the same way
I criticized the other...
“Forgive the injury”

echoes from the stairwell
as I retrace my footsteps

out of the basement

and back into the sunlight.
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Earlier in this thesis, I attempted to show how implementing the comic
frame could lead to the empathic frame. This poem, I believe, acts as a good

example of how “watching” internal rhetors can lead to the empathic frame, which
in turn can lead to the comic frame. Enough trips to the basement have taught

me that when I judge another harshly, I’m usually judging only one of their
unconscious rhetors—one of their internal “we’s”—and that I’m taking that

internal “we” as the entire person. I have to find a way to laugh at that and the
fact that usually, 1 am also seeing in the other one of my own “foibles.”

Otherwise, 1 need to find a way to be happy about grumbling and stumbling
around in the dark of the basement. Aside from illustrating how the empathic

frame can lead to the comic frame, I think this poem also helps to illustrate one of
the most important ideas in this thesis, internal "we’s” who use the rhetoric of

expediency.
Burke has much to say about our internal “we’s,” and references from two

separate sections in Attitudes Toward History might help clarify the “we’s” under

discussion in the poem above. “The so-called ‘I,’” Burke says, “is merely a
unique combination of partially conflicting ‘corporate we’s.’ [...] Sometimes these

various corporate identities work fairly well together. At other times they conflict,
with-disturbing moral consequences” (264). Here, he is talking mainly of the

“we’s” that identify “...with some corporate unit (church, guild, company, lodge,
party, team, college, city, nation, etc....” (267). These are the “we’s” we identify
with when, as is so often heard, we “put on a different hat” to perform some
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function relative to our particular “corporate unit.” However, the “we’s” described

in the poem are of another kind, the kind Burke addresses when he says, “For
various reasons, one has many disparate moods and attitudes. These may be

called sub-identities, subpersonalities, ‘voices’” (Attitudes 184). As Crusius puts
it, “The self is not sole or whole. There are many of us ‘in here’’’ (Kenneth Burke
39). These “we’s,” these "subpersonalities,” fall in two camps more or less, those

identified with unconsciously, and those identified with consciously, and they
inhabit two parts of the self respectively, the dissociated self and the associated

self.
Members of the dissociated self can quickly and unconsciously bristle at a

perceived injury, especially if that injury comes in the form of a bruise to one’s
deep felt identification with a particular “corporate unit.” Since it is their job to
speak the internal rhetoric of expediency, the rhetoric of pure self-interest, they
are often driven by fear. And under the conditions produced by fear it is easy to

identify with all sorts of internal negativity, becoming like Burke’s satirist: “...the

satirist attacks in others the weaknesses and temptations that are really within
himself (Attitudes 49; emphasis in original). Fortunately, though, Burke also

reminds us that we can always consciously choose “we’s” of another kind.
The following passage from “The Range of Rhetoric” is one of the most
important places to encounter Burke’s.ideas about people being “observers of

themselves” and while acknowledging a wide range of “sub-personalities,” seeing

that we have a choice:
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We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a
characteristic motive of rhetorical expression. We need not close

our eyes to their almost .tyrannous ubiquity in human relations; we

can be on the alert always.to see how such temptations to strife
are implicit in the institutions that condition human relationships;

yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the

principle of identification jn general, a terministic choice justified by
the fact that the identifications in the order of love are also

characteristic of rhetorical expression. (Rhetoric 20; emphasis

added)
Always, Burke says, we have a choice. He also says that we can choose to “be
on the alert always to see how...temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions
that condition human relationships." This “strife," this “enmity” and “faction” that

are “characteristic motives of rhetorical expression,” and have a presence

everywhere, he says, can be short-circuited by the “terministic choice" of
“identifications in the order of love.” He also states elsewhere that “in the
unwritten cosmic constitution that lies behind all man-made Constitutions, it is

decreed by the nature of things that each man is ‘necessarily free’.to be his own
tyrant...” (Language 52). Commenting on this subject, Crusius defines a couple

of paths that lead away from the oppressive dissociated self and toward the

associated self: “To some degree we can escape self-imposed tyranny through

dialogue, with its capacity to enlarge horizons and examine critically the terms we
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use. We can also deliberately cultivate a number of screens, increasing our

options for seeing” (Kenneth Burke 133). This idea of cultivating a number of
screens is closely connected to consciously choosing to go with members of the

associated self, for to “deliberately cultivate” anything, one needs to be conscious
of what one is doing. The comic frame and the empathic frame are both
conscious terministic choices. Individually each is only one among many ways of
seeing, but both fall under the heading of "identifications in the order of love.”

The comic frame is indirectly connected to societal salvation through
individual salvation. Crusius tells us that “Burke advocates comedy because he

believes he has good reason to fear that history has a tragic denouement, a
‘repetition compulsion’ requiring an endless line of victims that, short of

eliminating the symbol-using animal entirely, can never absolve or cleanse"

(Kenneth Burke 205). He later states:

We live in a century that will certainly be remembered for slaughter
and destruction on an unprecedented scale, whose narrative logic

thus far turns overwhelmingly on human sacrifice and self

victimization. What hope we might have for a different story cannot

but increase by a self-consciously comic attitude in all forms of
action and interaction. (208; emphasis in original)

According to Crusius, the comic frame offers far more than implied by the label
“salvation device” because even though it does act on a personal level, it

ultimately serves “what hope we might have” for society in general. This puts the

69

comic frame squarely in the middle of “identifications in the order of love" for as

one is “saving one’s hide” through “a self-consciously comic attitude in all forms

of action and interaction," one is also offering “hope" for civic progress.

Likewise, the empathic frame falls under the heading of “identifications in
the order of love," only more directly. The empathic frame is a way to consciously

connect with those parts of the associated self whose interest lies in identification
with the other. It is a way to tune.into the other and connect with compassion.

And, unless we are, as Crusius puts it, “what we call ...psychopaths,” we should .
have the ability to come up with our own empathic frame, and it will be just ,
another frame. However, by its nature it will become one’s own path to that part

of the self Levinas calls the “conscience morale.”
I believe both the comic and the empathic frames deserve what Burke
would call “special favors." It doesn’t matter whether one believes there are at

least a couple of “absolute truths" or one is a postmodern sophist with a
conscience who realizes we are in need of a “necessary fiction." Either way, one
would have to agree that both the comic and the empathic frame are required for-

the progression of the individual and society.
Burke had no problem claiming that dramatism was “just another

terministic screen,” yet he also believed that “something so indispensable to

explaining why we behave as we do. and why we condemn certain behavior that
ignores the implicit rules can surely claim ‘special favors’" (Crusius Kenneth
Burke.136; emphasis in original). Speaking of “Hitlerite Germany,” a time when
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the fabric of society was ripped to shreds by those who ‘‘[ignored] the implicit
rules,” Burke says that “impersonal terminology” promotes disaster and that it isonly a step from “treating inanimate nature as mere ‘things’ to treating animals,

and then enemy peoples as mere things. But they are not mere things, they are

persons—and in the systematic denial of what one knows in his heart to be the
truth, there is a perverse principle that can generate much anguish” (Rhetoric

32).-1 believe the connotations of this single phrase: “what one knows in his heart

to be the truth,” need to be fostered now more than ever. We need to find ways

to incorporate a more personal terminology in the study of rhetoric. Without a
way to openly discuss “what one knows in his heart to be the truth,” without a
way to openly discuss a conscious connection with the conscience, we run the

risk of losing our ability to see both the suffering and the value of the other. And
that, Burke claims, “can generate much anguish.”
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